Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1953

Seaboard Finance Company v. Howard G. Wahlen
and Barbara M. Wahlen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Howard J. Jones; EkSayn Anderson; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Seaboard Finance Co. v. Wahlen, No. 7890 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1806

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

:';t,g
llf1
. '- J
'

-

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

FILED
JAN 12 ·. _tJ

/Ill- --

-------------------------------·--~u-~--

SEABOARD FINANCE GOMP ANY,
a Utah Corporation,
App-ellant,
-vs.-

~l

rk, Supreme Court Utili

'

Case No.
7890

HOWARD G. WAHLEN, and
BARBARA M. WAHLEN,
Respondents.

Appellant's Brief

HOWARD N. JONES
EKSAYN ANDERSON
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF POINTS........................................................................ 5
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 6
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT "THE ONLY ISSUE
IN THE CASE WAS WHETHER THE LOAN BY THE
PLAINTIFF WAS USURIOUS".................................................. 6
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LOAN BY THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANTS WHEREBY "THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED FROM THE PLAINTIFF THE
SUM OF $1,000.00, AND THE SUM OF $20.00 AS
VALUE RECEIVED BY WAY OF AN INSURANCE
POLICY", WAS USURIOUS ...................................................... 6
POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE BASIS OF COMPUTING INTEREST AND
CHARGES UPON THE LOAN IN QUESTION WAS
THE SUM OF $1,378.38, THE FACE AMOUNT OF
SAID LOAN .................................................................................... 6
POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
MAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS AS PROPOSED IN
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS ............ 13
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
AMEND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF..... ~ 17
POINT 6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND
AGAINST DEFENDANTS .......................................................... 17
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 17
AUTHORITIES CITED
(Cases)
Bowden vs. Gabel, (Mont.), 76 Pac. 2nd 334.......................................... 13
Cobb vs. Hartenstein, 47 Utah 174, 152 Pac. 424 .................................. 14
Connor vs. Minier, (Cal.), 288 Pac. 23 .................................................... 12
Culmer Paint & Glass Co. vs. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 Pac. 66...... 15
People's Finance & Thrift Co. vs. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285
Pac. 304 ···--·········--········-···················----····-·-········-·-··············· ............. .... 7
Rospigliosi vs. Glenallen Mining Co., et al., 69 Utah 41, 252
Pac. 276 .............................................................................................. 12, 15
(Texts)
25 Corpus Juris, Page 339 .........~---·······························--········-············------- 12
35 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 382...................................................... 12
STATUTES CITED
Section 7-6-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Laws
of Utah, 1945, Chapter 73.................................................................... 6
Section 17, National Bankruptcy Act....................................................... 16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
7890

'"','

HOWARD G. WAHLEN, and
BARBARA M. WAHLEN,
··
Respondents.

Appellant's Brief
In the above entitled action plaintiff is the appellant
and appeals from a judgment rendered in the above
cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by the plaintiff in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for the C.ounty of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, on a promissory note and chattel
mortgage executed by the _d~fendants Ho.ward.G. Wahlen
and Barbara M. Wahlen in favor of the plaintiff. Said
note and mortgage were dated the 2nd day of July 1951.
1
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The face of said note is the sum of Thirteen Hundred
Seventy Eight and 38/100 Dollars ($1,378.38), and is
payable to plaintiff in 24 monthly· installments of $57.44
each.
The case came on for pre-trial hearing upon the
complaint and answer of the parties, and the court made
and entered its original and amended findings of facts
and conclusions of law upon the issue and defense raised
by the defendant's answer, to-wit: tJ sury; and thereupon entered judgment in favor of defendants. From
the court's judgment in favor of defendants the plaintiff
takes this appeal.
The findings of facts and conclusions of law made
and entered by the court as amended by stipulation of
counsel and ordered by the court (Item 14 of the designation of record as amended by item 19) are as follows:
(Tr. P. 11, 12, 20)

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That· at ·an times mentioned the plaintiff was
a Corporation duly organized and operating by
virtue of the Laws of the State of Utah and was
engaged in the business of loaning money as an
Industrial Loan Corporation.
2. That on or about the 2nd- day of July, 1951,
the defendants applied to the plaintiff for a loan
in an amount sufficient to give them net c.ash
proceeds of at least $1,000.00 "rhich was to be
repaid within 24 months.·
'
3. That OJ?- the 1st day of July 1951 the defendants· rec-eived · fro·m the plai~tiff · t.he ·. sum ·of
.2
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$1,000.00 and the sum of $20.00 as value received
by "~ay of an Insurance Policy, the premium of
$20.00 "~hich was advanced by plaintiff, and thereupon executed a note in the sum of $1,378.38, payable to the plaintiff in 24 equal installments of
$57.44 each installment.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact the
Court makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the loan by the plaintiff is usurious and
the defendant is entitled to a judgment of No
Cause of Action.
Thereupon judgment was entered in favor of defendants (Tr. P. 8).
At the pre-trial hearing the 'facts were discussed
and briefs were ordered to be submitted ·by respective
counsel upon the following issue :
Whether the basis for applying the interest and
charges allowed by the statute is the sum of $1020.00
or $1378.38.
In addition to the facts which were included in the
court's final findings of fact as set forth above; the following facts were stipulated to bet,veen counsel at the
pre:-tria_l.
a. That the· Banking Co.inmissioner of the State of
Utah would testify that the computation· of. the
·.3
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interest and charges made on the note involved
herein conformed to the law and regulations of
the State of Utah.
b. That an officer of the plaintiff would testify that
plaintiff relied on defendant's statement in the
note as to his ownership of the mortgaged
chattels.
Said stipulations were set forth on page one of
plaintiff's answer brief submitted to the trial court as
referred to above, (Tr. P. 29), and were not controverted
by defendants. Said two stipulations were included in
plaintiff's proposed findings of fact, (Tr. P. 9A, 9B),
but the trial court refused to include said stipulated
facts in its amended findings on the ground that they
were immaterial. This is one of the grounds upon which
•
this appeal is ~aken.
Following the entry of the judgment in favor of
defendant and against plaintiff, the latter made a motion
to. amend the same and to enter judgment in favor of
plaintiff (Tr. P. 10). This motion was heard by the trial
court and resulted in certain corrections being made to
the Findings (Tr. P. 11).· The Court, ho,vever, refused
to adopt all of plaintiff's proposed Findings and further
refused to amend its judgment. From the order of the
Court refusing to amend its original Judgment and enter
Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants
this a ppea1 is also taken.
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT "THE ONLY
ISSUE IN THE CASE WAS 'VHETHER THE LOAN
BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS USURIOUS''.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LOAN BY THE
PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANTS WHEREBY
''THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED FROM THE
PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $1,000.00, AND THE SUM
OF $20.00 AS VALUE RECEIVED BY WAY OF AN
INSURANCE POLICY", WAS USURIOUS.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE BASIS OF COJ\fPUTING INTEREST
AND CHARGES UPON THE LOAN IN QUESTION
WAS THE SUM OF $1,378.38, THE FACE AMOUNT
OF S~~ID LOAN.
4.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
~lAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS AS PROPOSED IN
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS.
5.

TI-IE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
~t\.MEND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.
6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
5
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ARGUMENT
Points 1 2 and 3 will be presented and discussed
' '
together for the purpose of argument.

POINT 1. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT ''THE
ONLY ISSUE IN THE CASE WAS WI-IETHER THE
LOAN BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS USURIOUS''.
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LOAN
BY THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANT
WHEREBY "THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED
FROM THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $1,000.00,
AND THE SUJ\1: OF $20.00 AS VALUE RECEIVED
BY WAY OF AN INSURANCE POLICY WAS
USURIOUS.
- "POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE BASIS OF COMPUTING INTEREST AND CHARGES UPON THE LOAN IN
QUE-STION WAS THE SUM OF $1,378.38 THE FACE
AMOUNT OF SAID LOAN.
Section 7-6-3, Utah Code .A. nnotated 1943, as amended
by the Laws of 1945, Chapter 73, provides the following
with regard to the powers of an Industrial Loan Corporation:
"Every Industrial Loan Corporation shall have
power:
( 1) To loan money on the personal undertaking
of the borrower and other persons, or on personal
-6
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8eeurity, or other,vise, and to deduct interest
thereon IN ADVANCE at the rate of one per
cent or less of the FACE OF SUCH LOAN per
month, and, in addition, to require payment in
uniform "~eekly, semimonthly or monthly installments, "Tith or \Yithout an allowance of interest
on such installments, and to charge a fee of $2 or
less_ on loans of $100 or less and a maximum fee
of t\YO per cent on loans in exc.ess of $100 for expense in examining and investigating the character and circumstances of the borrower; provided, that such examining and investigating fee
shall not be assessed to any borrower more often
than once in each six month period, and provided
further that no charge shall be collected unless a
loan shall have been made." (Emphasis supplied).
This court in the case of People's Finance and Thrift
Co. vs. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304, construed and
applied the provisions of Chapter 116, Laws of Utah
1925, which is the same as Section 7-6-3, Utah Code
Annotated 1943 as amended, except that the 1925 act
provided for 12% per annum in place of 1% per month
provided by the present act. Also the· Code has been
amended by the 1945 Act in a minor respect not material
here with regard to charging but one investigation fee
in earh six month period.
In the Varney case, the plaintiff was also an Indus·trial Loan Company operating under the Laws of the
State of Utah. In that case the plaintiff in making the
loan deducted from the $200.00 face of the note $2.00 as
and for an investigating fee and $20.00 interest in advance, and paid to Varney the balance of $178.00. The
loan involved 'vas for a period of 10 months and interest

7
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was charged accordingly. Also an investigation fee of
$2.00 was charged in lieu of the authorized amount of
$4.00 collection which could have been charged under
the statute. Upon a claim of usury being raised by the
defendant Varney, the court rendered a judgment against
the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, which judgment was affirmed by this court on appeal. This Court
stated:
'' ... The face of the note is $200. . .. So far
as material, it provides that the defendants
promised to pay to the order of the plaintiff $200
'in ten installments of $20.00 each' ... " (Page
356)
''As is seen . . . When the ref ore the company
deducted 12 per cent per annum as it did on the
face of the note, as interest in advance for the 10
month period of the loan, it but did what the
statute expressly authorized such a company to
do. The interest deducted was $20.00, which is
the interest on $200.00 for a period of ten months
at. the rate of 12 per cent per annum. When the
company 'in addition' required the loan to be
paid in monthly installments of· $20.00 each, it
again but did what the statute expressly permitted
such a company to do. Such, we think, is not only
the reasonable, but the necessary, meaning to be
given the statute. we do not see wherein it in
such respect is doubtful or uncertain." (Page 360)
(Emphasis supplied)
On the point as to an apparent conflict between the
1925 Statute and the .General Usury Statute, the court
at Page 361 of the Varney case held that the General
Usury Statute must .give way to the 1925 Act and de'
scribed the 1925 Act as a ''special and subsequent
act,
8
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and 'Yhich expressly repeals all }a.,v·s 1n conflict there,,. ith. ''
It is apparent from the foregoing that the computation of interest "Tas based upon the face of the note
""hich as stated by the court 'vas $200.00. The Court
further emphasized and identified the sum of $200.00 as
being the face of the note by commenting that said
amount was the amount promised by the defendants to
be repaid ''in ten installments of $20.00' '.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the charges
authorized by the statute and approved by the Supreme
Court in the Varney case were based upon the face
amount of the note which 'vas the amount sho,vn on the
face of the document as being the amount to be repaid,
and not the amount which was actually received by the
borrower. The Court further expressly approved the
act of the plaintiff in 'vithholding "in advance" the
charges made, and stated that the plaintiff's "but did
\Vhat the statute expressly authorized such a company
to do".
X o'v in the present case, as in the Varney case, the
plaintiff but did 'vhat the ·statute expressly authorized
such a company to do, to-wit: upon the application by the
defendants ''for a loan in an amount sufficient to give
them net cash proceeds of at -least $1,000.00 which was
to be repaid 'vi thin 24 months," as set forth in paragraph two of the Findings of Fact as stipulated (Page
20 of the Transcript of Record) a computation was made
which resulted in the figure of $1,378.38 as being the
face amount of the loan, which 'vhen reduced by the
.9
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charges authorized by this statute, "rould leave a balance
as required by the defendants. The addition of $20.00,
advanced by the plai.ntiff as_~ pr,emium for an ins"ura~ce
policy_-~_a_u~.l~~~t~~iy_~d by .the defendants in addition
to the $1,000.00 as set forth in paragraph three of the
Findings of Fact.

.l :

In brief, the computation formula contemplated a
total of interest at one per cent per month for the 24
month period of the note, plus the two percent investigation fee, both of which were allowed by the statute.
Since a total of 26 per cent was allowed to be deducted
by the statute, the remainder to be delivered to the borrower would amount to that percentage remaining, or
74% of the note. Thus the $1020.00 actually delivere~
. to the borrower and received by him represented 74 per
· cent of the face of the note. Therefore, by dividing
$1020.00 by 74 and multiplying the quotient by 100, we
arrive at 100 per eent of the face of the note or $1,378.38.
.To prove the accuracy of this calculation it is only
necessary to reduce the face of the note by 26 per cent
allowed to be deducted, thus arriving at the .$1020.00
'vhich was the amount received by the borro,ver .

.

In the present case the application of the statute is
exactly the same as in the Varney case. In both cases
the charges were based upon the face of the note, and in
both cases the amounts to be repaid were shown upon
the face of the instruments as the amounts which the
respective borrowers were obligated to repay in a given
number of monthly installments, which monthly installments were authorized by the statute. _The .only differ-

10
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ence bet"'"een the two cases is that the defendants Wahlen
in the present case wanted to receive a specified amount,
and the face of the note had to be arrived at by calculation in order to leave the desired amount for delivery to
defendants after making the rharges and interest deductions in the same manner as approYed by the Supreme
Court in the Varney case.
In the case at bar the statute expressly authorizes
the taking of interest in advance and it is noted that that
authorization applies to the particular class of lenders
which qualify under the provisions of Title 7 of our Code.
It is stipulated and a fact that plaintiff so qualifies and
is entitled to the benefits of that particular statute.
Accordingly our case is not governed by the general
statutes on usury but by the particular provisions of
Title 7, as stated by this Court in the Varney case.
The application of the statute to the facts of the
case at bar is very clear. Conformity was made very
strictly to the provisions of the statute in the computation of the interest and charges made herein. This court
has ruled on the validity and superceding effect of the
statute a.s applied to Industrial Loan Companies, of
'vhich plaintiff is a member. That decision also affirmed
the application of the statute to a similar factual situation. There \vas no occasion for confusing interpretations
of the statute in that case, as there are none in this case.
The provisions of the statute are clear _and the· application thereof to the facts in the case at bar is likewise
clear. In such a situation there is no basis for a different

11
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interpretation, and certainly no ground for a forfeiture.
Further, on the question of forfeiture, this Court
said in the case of Rospigliosi vs. Glenallen Mining Co.,
et al., 69 Ut. 41, 252 Pac. 276, at Page 279:
"It is true that it is the duty of courts to enforce the plain intent of the statute when the
parties entitled to the benefit of the statute ask
for its protection. Courts do not, however, and
ought not, so interpret a legislative act that the
property of one citizen is forfeited and lost to
another, unless the plain and unequivocal mandate
of the Legislature admits of no other construction. ''
In 25 Corpus Juris, Page 339, "Face Value" is defined as, ''The valae·~xpt'e'Ssed on -the.~ face of·tt,· wr-iting
in the.. commodity in whieh-· it .,is payable.''
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 35, Page 382,
''Face Value'' is defined as :
''The value expressed on the face of a writing
in the commodity in which it is payable; the value
which can be ascertained from the language of
the instrument without any aid from extrinsic
facts Or evidence; and \Vhen applied to interest
bearing notes and like instruments, the phrase has
been held to me.:::tn the amount_n.amed .ont-the
notes.''
The expression ''face amount of the loan'' was used
in the California case of Connor vs. lVIinier, 288 Pac. 23,
at Page 25, a case involving a note payable in the sum
of $300~oo and ·wherein after· expense and interest ,vere

12
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deducted the sum of $270.00 cash was actually received.
In that ease the ''face amount of the loan'' was the
$300.00 as sho,vn to be payable by the express wording
of the note.
In the ease of Bowden vs. Gabel, (Mont.), 76 Pac.
2nd 334, the expression ''face of the note'' was interpreted as being the amount sho,vn payable by the express
wording of the note and was not the amount of inoney
''Thich actually was received by the borrower.
These two cases are cited on this point of definition
of "face of loan" but are inapplicable on other points.
POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED IN
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF F AC.T.
In plaintiff's proposed findings of fact found on
Pages 9 A and B of the Transcript of Record, it was
submitted that the following facts were stipulated and
agreed to by counsel at the pre-trial. hearing and should
be included in the findings of facts:
"4 (b) That the banking commissioner of the
State of Utah 'vould testify that the interest and
charges made on the note involved herein conforms to the law and regulations of the State of
Utah.''
"4 (c) That an officer of the plaintiff would testify that plaintiff relied on defendant's statement
in the note as to his ownership of the mortgaged
chattels.''
.13
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The materiality of the stipulated fact relating to
the testimony of the Banking Commissioner is shown by
the Cobb vs. Hartenstein and the Culmer Paint and Glass
Company vs. Gleason cases discussed hereafter. Since
such stipulated testimony of the Banking Commissioner
is material, it is submitted that it was error for the Court
to refuse to amend the findings to include such statements.
In Cobb vs. Hartenstein, Utah, 152 Pac. 424, the
Supreme Court stated at page 427:
''In short, the general rule of interpretation
and construction of such contracts may be said
to be that the contract is not usurious when it may
be explained on any other hypothesis.''
The Court also cited a Kansas case with approval
and added its own emphasis by saying:
''Again, the existence of a usurious contract is
never presumed. Where an agreement to pay
interest is subject to two constructions, one of
which would make it usurious, and the other not,
the court will adopt the latter ... The burden is
,upon the party seeking to impeach the transac. ,,...,~:'/;tion to show guilty intent, and that the contract
_ivas a cover for usury." (Emphasis by Utah
Court)
The Court stated at Page 431:
"In our judgment, the trial court was too
g:ea~ly influenced by the fact that the plaintiff
d1d, In fact, pay to the defendant more than the
amount permitted by our statute. After the fact
was · found the court see·mingly deduced every
inference against the leg:;tlity of the-· transactions.

14
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No other conclusion is permissible. That view, as
"'"e have seen is wholly repudiated by the courts.
This case, therefore, affords another instance
where too much stress is laid upon ex post facto
acts and conduct.''
The Cobb case involved stock brokerage transactions,
margins and similar transactions. The Court held that
there was not sufficient intent on the part of the lender,
and therefore no usury.
In Culmer Paint and Glass Company vs. Gleason,
(Utah), 130 Pac. 66, a case involving two· notes· and
mortgages, on the subject of policy and construction, the
court said, at page 68 :
''Courts always---abhor··forfeitures, and -this is
especially _true -of courts· of· equity. Forfeitures,
therefore, especially such as have the effect. of
taking property from one and giving it to another,
should be enforced only when the proof is· elear
and convincing, if not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Counsel for appellant practically concede that by
computing interest upon one method there is, perhaps, no usury, but that, if it be computed upon
another, then there is usury in the .transaction.
This, to say the least, leave~ the matter in doubt,
and in view of such doubt we ought not to enforce
the forfeiture."
Also, see Rospigliosi vs. Glenallen
supra.

~lining

Company,

In the case at bar, the defendant contends that interest should have been computed on the am~unt :Of cash
received by the. defendant . and the amo~n~: :th:e!eof

15
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ADDED TO the cash received, the total thus derived
being the amount of the note. This contention is diametrically opposite to the express language of the
statute which provides "and to DEDUCT interest
thereon IN ADVANCE at the rate of one per cent or
less of the FACE OF SUCH LOAN per month." By no
interpretation or construction, however strained, can the
language of the statute be said to contemplate a method
of computation which embraces the principle of ADDING
interest to arrive at the amount of the note. The construction and computation contended for by the plaintiff
follows the express provisions of the particular statute
governing Industrial Loan Companies and is the only
reasonable construction and computation possible under
the language of the statute. There is nothing whatever
to indicate that such construction was availed of for the
purpose of evading the law. Therefore, it is respectfully
submitted that no forfeiture should be declared in this
case, and that the decision of the lower court should be
reversed ·and plaintiff granted judgment.
The stipulated testimony a.s to reliance by the plaintiff on defendant's statement in the note as to his ownership of the mortgaged chattels is material as a basic fact
supporting a judgment against the defendants which
would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy, as having
been secured by fraud of the defendants. Accordingly,
such stipulation was material 'vhich should have been
included in the amended findings.
Section 17 of the National Bankruptcy Act relating
to debts not affected by discharge, and particularly sub-

16
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section (2) provides that liabilities for obtaining money
or property by false pretenses or false representations
shall not be discharged.
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO AMEND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF.
POINT 6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
The judgment granted by the court in favor of defendants was not based upon the facts and the law. The
plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and the court erred
in refusing to grant judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants.
The Court· also erred in refusing to amend its judgment upon motion of plaintiff and grant judgment 1n
favor of plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this case involves a loan made under
authority of the Industrial Loan Act of the State of
Utah, with charges authorized by the express provisions
of such act. It was also made in accordance with the
construction and interpretation of such act heretofore
made by this Court. Further, it conforms to the regulations of the Banking Commissioner- of the State of
Utah. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the

17
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loan herein was legal and valid and was not usurious,
and that the decision of the lower court should be reversed and plaintiff granted judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWARD N. JONES
EKSAYN ANDERSON
Attorn.eys for Appella;nt
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